A correctly and continually working authorization and authentication service is essential for the grid computing system, so it is very necessary to maintain efficient this service with high availability and integrity in the face of a variety of attacks. An intrusion-resilient framework of authorization and authentication service for grid computing system is presented in this paper. This service is able to provide fault tolerance and security even in the presence of a fraction of corrupted authorization and authentication servers, avoiding any single point of failure. We use a cryptographic (f, n) secret sharing scheme to distribute parts of the clients' proxy certificates and use a secure multi-party computation scheme to perform the signatures such that the proxy certificate can be issued in a distributed fashion without reassembly when a legal client registrant at the Globus host. By using Non-Malleable Proof, the "man-in-the-middle attack" can be prevented; by distributing the secret data across several authorization and authentication servers, the compromise of a few servers will not compromise the availability of data. And, under the assumption of a Diffie-Hellman decisional problem, a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the system's private key X, and so cannot to issue the certification for any client, neither to impersonate a legal authorization and authentication server.
Introduction
At the base of any grid environment, there must be mechanisms to provide security, including authentication, authorization, data encryption, and so on. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) component of the Globus Toolkit provides robust security mechanisms. Especially, it provides a single sign-on mechanism, so that once a client is authenticated, the certificate authority in the GSI will generate a proxy certificate and send it to the client, then the client can use the proxy certificate to perform actions within the grid computing system. But this mechanism has its own drawback. For example, since all clients' certificates are maintained by the certificate authority, it requires the certificate authority to be trusted and so introduces dependence upon the certificate authority and thus creates a single point of failure, and, if successfully compromised, would immediately lead to the exposure of all clients' confidentiality of certificates, interruption communication, or other forms of denial of service.
Yuanbo Guo 1,2 , Jianfeng Ma 2 , and Yadi Wang 1 To address this issue, in this paper we present an intrusion-resilient authorization and authentication framework for grid computing infrastructure, that removes this single point of failure by distributing the authorization and authentication service among n authorization and authentication servers (which will be denoted as AASs briefly in the remaining of the paper). The framework uses a verifiable secret sharing scheme to distribute shares of the system's secret to AASs and use a secure multiparty computation scheme to perform the signatures such that the proxy certificate can be signed in a distributed fashion without reassembly. When a legal client want to sign-on the grid computing system, he/she sends a sign-on request to the Globus host firstly, the Globus host will forward this request to a his-own-choosing subset of the n AASs, and the contacted AASs answer with some information enabling the client to compute his own proxy certificate and verify its correctness.
Our framework is intended to tolerate the compromise of up to f AASs, where
Compromised AASs are assumed to be under the full control of an attacker and to have Byzantine behavior 1 , but it is also assumed that the attacker cannot break the cryptographic algorithms used. Under these assumptions, our service ensures the confidentiality, integrity and availability of authorization and authentication service for grid computing infrastructure. Also, our system is designed to be easy to embed into existing grid computing environment. For example, the AASs are built with commodity PCs, an administrator can just swap a failed host out with another.
System Architecture
Let Client = {C 1 , . . . , C m } be a set of m clients and let AAS = {AAS 1 , . . . , AAS n } be a set of n AASs(authorization and authentication servers for grid computing infrastructure). All of them share a global clock (i.e., the system is synchronous). Each client connects himself or herself with 2f + 1 AASs by point-to-point encrypted and authenticated channels, where f is the threshold of secret sharing scheme we used. The member in the AASs can be good (i.e., it honestly executes the protocol) or bad (i.e., it is controlled by an adversary and can deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways), but a majority of good AASs are always present across the system.
The service works as follows. A dealer, which is needed only in the system initialization phase, distributes system's private key X among all n AASs by using Feldman's (f+1, n) VSS scheme [3] straight forward. So along with the secret shares, he also generates a verification share to go along with each key share, and broadcast the verification shares to all clients.
Each secret share is then distributed secretly to a different AAS, and all corresponding verification shares are broadcast to all of the clients. No AAS knows the whole X, but only knows his own assigned share.
The architecture of our intrusion-resilient authorization and authentication service can be illustrated as Figure 1 .
Each AAS maintains a configuration file which specifies what types of resource are allowed to be access by which client. When a client wants to apply for some services of or execute a task on the grid computing system, he/she registers himself/herself at the Globus hosts firstly, with the submission of his/her password or some others type of credential and the requested services or tasks. Then, Globus host will performs the initial validation; if success, it sends an authentication and authorization request to the AASs on behalf of the client. Based on the identification of the client, each AAS consults its configuration files to determine what resources in the grid environment are authorized to the client, and then uses its share of the system's private key to compute and send a share of proxy certificate to the client, which we called sub-certificate in the remaining paper. It also uses its verification share to compute a zero-knowledge proof which will prove the correctness of its sub-certificate.
These sub-certificate and zero-knowledge proofs are then collected by the Globus host. Then, the host chooses f of them. After verifying the correctness of all of the proofs of these sub-certificates, it can combine them to form the actual proxy certificate and send it to the client. Afterwards, the client can request the needed resources to the grid computing system by using this proxy certificate. The shares X 1 , … , X n must then be distributed secretly to the n authorization and authentication servers AAS 1 , . . . , AAS n , respectively. The generator g and the elements g 1 , ….,g n are made public. They must be known by all clients and all AASs. Each AAS i can verifies the share X i he or she received by using g and g i .
As in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [4] , any subset of f+1 values among X 1 , …., X n allows one to reconstruct F by interpolation, and then to compute the value X AAS = F(0). For example, given 
Registration and Proxy Certificate Generation Phase:
When a client C, whose ID is ID C , wants to apply for some services or execute some tasks, he/she registers at the Globus host firstly. The client should submit to Globus host his/her password or other credential and the requested services or tasks. On receiving these information, the Globus host will then performs the initial validation of the client; if successes, it sends an authentication and authorization request to a robust subset of AASs (in our case, the servers of size at least 2f+1, where f is the threshold of the secure secret sharing scheme we used) on behalf of the client. Each AAS does the following: Cert ), and then send it to the Globus host.
In step 3) and 4), both s i and t i are used here to prove the validity of SC i without revealing X i . This uses a technique of non-malleable proof proposed by [5] .
After receiving Then, a proxy certificate containing the signature SC for client C can be generated and send to client C by Globus host.
Afterwards, the proxy certificate can be used by the client to access the grid resources he/she needs.
Security Analysis

Correctness and Robustness
By correctness and robustness, we mean that all legal clients can get a correct proxy certificate if there are no more than f dishonest AASs.
Theorem 1:
If there are no more than f dishonest AASs, then all legal clients can get a correct proxy certificate.
Proof: In our case, we only need to show that Globus host will compute a correct SC= X C X for legal client C . From the details of the framework we know that, before Globus host compute and recover SC, it has received and verified f+1 sub-certificates 
Security Against Impersonators Attack
Impersonations means that server AAS j impersonate server AAS i to send message (SC i , s i , t i , C) to the Globus host.
Theorem 2:
In the random oracle model, a dishonest AAS cannot forge, with a non negligible probability, a valid proof for a valid sub-certificate.
Proof: From the above scheme we know that SC i , s i , t i satisfy the following equations: 
This yields two possible cases:
In this case, the sub-certificate is correct. ≤ . Since a computationally bounded server can only try a polynomial number of triplets, then when k is large, the probability of success, which is 
